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JAMES A. GARDNER* 
In a well-known and widely cited 1977 law review article, Justice 
William J. Brennan called on state courts to “step into the breach” 
and use their authority as independent interpreters of state 
constitutions to continue on the state level the expansion of individual 
liberties begun on the national level by the Warren Court. Justice 
Brennan was right about the importance of independent state 
constitutional law, but he was wrong about the reason. The benefits of 
independent state constitutional law have little to do with expanding 
human rights and everything to do with federalism. The confusion is 
understandable; both individual rights and federalism protect liberty, 
but they do so by very different mechanisms, and those mechanisms 
can at times operate at cross-purposes. Federalism protects liberty not 
by offering an opportunity for the continuous expansion of human 
rights protections, but by creating a system of dual agency in which 
the people appoint two agents, one state and one federal, to monitor 
and check the abuses and errors of the other. Nothing in that system 
inherently requires the expansion of rights on the state level, and it 
can just as easily support their contraction. The value of independent 
state constitutional law lies in its availability as a tool by which state 
agents can protect the people’s interests by staking out and 
institutionalizing positions opposing those taken by the national 
government, whatever they may be. In the arena of rights, it is thus to 
be expected—and it is observed—that the state and national 
governments will sometimes agree and sometimes disagree about the 
appropriate scope of protection to be afforded various human rights, 
and that disagreement may manifest itself in a competitive struggle in 
which each level attempts to advance its own view at the expense of 
the other. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May of 1976, in the unlikely venue of the Playboy Resort Hotel at Great 
Gorge, New Jersey, Associate Justice William J. Brennan delivered a speech at 
an event held by the New Jersey Bar Association in honor of Brennan’s 
seventieth birthday and twentieth year on the U.S. Supreme Court bench.1 The 
speech, published the following year in the Harvard Law Review,2 quickly 
became, according to his biographers, “the most famous and widely quoted of 
his entire career.”3 Brennan’s topic was the protection for individual rights 
contained in American state constitutions.4 The U.S. Bill of Rights, Brennan 
argued, is a powerful protector of individual liberty, but it is not the only 
source of protection. State constitutions, he observed, also protect liberty 
through their own bills of rights.5 Because the constitutional system of 
federalism makes states independent sovereigns, Brennan went on, state 
constitutional protections for human rights are independent of those provided 
by the U.S. Constitution.6 This means in turn that state constitutions may—and 
in Brennan’s opinion should—offer greater security for individual rights than 
does the U.S. Constitution, at least as construed by the Supreme Court in a 
                                                                                                                     
 1 SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 434–36 
(2010). 
 2 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 3 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 436. 
 4 Brennan, supra note 2, at 489. 
 5 Id. at 495. 
 6 Id. at 491, 502. 
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series of then-recent cases interpreting federal rights in ways that Brennan 
found unduly stingy.7 State courts, Brennan intimated, should thus look to 
their own bills of rights to continue the Warren Court’s expansion of 
individual liberty, of which Brennan had been a key architect.8 
Brennan’s plea did not fall on deaf ears. In the quarter-century preceding 
publication of the article, state courts around the nation had issued fewer than 
fifty rulings in which they construed state constitutions to be more protective 
of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution—about two per year.9 In the 
decade following Brennan’s article, the pace of such rulings increased at least 
tenfold.10 Within just eight years, Brennan’s article had shot up the list of 
most-cited law review articles to the top twenty of all time, taking its place 
alongside many articles that had been in circulation much longer.11 
Nevertheless, reaction to Brennan’s article was far from uniformly 
positive. On the bench, Brennan had long been associated with nationalistic, 
centralizing rulings in which federal law had been applied unsentimentally to 
override state policy decisions of all kinds—policies on racial segregation,12 
electoral structures,13 the death penalty,14 obscenity,15 religious instruction in 
schools,16 and many others. Critics deemed Brennan’s newfound interest in 
federalism opportunistic, and characterized his interest in state constitutions as 
arising from a purely instrumental desire to harness them in an ideological war 
that he had begun to lose at the national level.17 
In this respect, Brennan’s article raised more questions than it answered. 
Brennan urged state courts to adjudicate cases under human rights provisions 
of state constitutions, but if his challenge was more than what his critics 
claimed—if it was really a principled appeal to constitutional rules of 
federalism rather than an opportunistic mobilization of ideological allies—then 
                                                                                                                     
 7 Id. at 495–98. 
 8 Id. at 502–03. 
 9 GARDNER, supra note *, at 40. 
 10 Id. at 40–41. One estimate places the increase at more like 35–fold. Sol Wachtler, 
Our Constitutions—Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 397 (1987). 
 11 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540, 
1550 (1985). 
 12 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 13 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1962). 
 14 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
 15 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47–48 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 16 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
 17 Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—Away from a Reactionary 
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (1981); Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: 
Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 783–84 (1982); 
Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional 
Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 432–33 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic 
of the “New Judicial Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 233, 235–36 (1989) 
[hereinafter Maltz, Political Dynamic]; see also Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, and State Constitutions: The Evolution of a State 
Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 763, 767–71 (1998) (reviewing critiques). 
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state courts would need a sound jurisprudential basis for heeding Brennan’s 
call. How should state constitutional rights provisions be interpreted? On what 
basis ought they to be interpreted to have a different—and more generous—
meaning than the U.S. Constitution? Answering these questions turned out to 
be more difficult than Brennan seemed to anticipate, and in the end only a 
handful of state supreme courts showed an interest in unraveling the knotty 
jurisprudential issues. 
Finally, although the article provoked a brief flurry of rights-protective 
state constitutional rulings, for the most part state courts showed a marked 
tendency even after the article’s publication to issue individual rights rulings 
by resting them solely on the U.S. Constitution without—contrary to 
Brennan’s urging—giving any consideration at all to state constitutional 
protections.18 In those cases in which state courts looked to the state 
constitution at all, as Brennan had recommended, they tended over time to 
construe their constitutions in conformity with the U.S. Constitution in the 
great majority of cases.19 In the end, although Brennan’s article did much to 
excite the appetite of rights liberals, it had little long-term impact on the 
practices of state courts. 
This Symposium offers a welcome occasion to reflect on why this might 
be so. I argue here that Brennan’s pitch failed to gain much long-term traction 
among state judges not because it rested on an instrumental view of state 
constitutional rights provisions, but because it rested on an incomplete 
conception of federalism. Brennan was right that federalism makes state 
constitutions jurisprudentially independent from the U.S. Constitution, and 
that state courts may exercise this independence so as to read state 
constitutional rights more generously than their federal counterparts. In this 
respect he was indeed a shrewd analyst of the workings of the federal system. 
Brennan’s mistake, however, was that he failed to locate the federalism of 
constitutional rights within the much broader context of the federalism of 
intergovernmental relations, a system of long-term, often shifting power 
relationships created and structured by the U.S. Constitution. When properly 
contextualized, human rights federalism can be better understood as only one 
of many arenas in which state and national governments may contest for 
power, and the deployment of rights as only one of many tools that states may 
wield against the federal government to get their way in intergovernmental 
policy disputes. This, in my view, helps not only to resolve the puzzling 
questions of interpretation that Brennan’s notion of rights federalism raised, 
but also to explain why Brennan’s account has never provided an accurate 
description of the actual practices of state courts. 
                                                                                                                     
 18 Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 
28 (1994). 
 19 Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court “Revolution,” 74 
JUDICATURE 190, 192–93 (1991); James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State 
Constitutions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (2000). 
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The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part II establishes the 
context in which Brennan wrote his article, and briefly reviews its argument, 
culminating in his famous call to state courts to “step into the breach.”20 Part 
III discusses the jurisprudential problems that arose in the aftermath of the 
article, focusing on the widespread confusion that the article provoked 
concerning the proper methodology for interpreting state constitutional 
provisions. Part IV sets out an alternative view of subnational constitutional 
independence, grounding it in a Madisonian understanding of federalism as 
implementing a two-government system of dual agency, a system that is 
designed to produce permanent contestation between national and subnational 
governments. In that context, the deployment of independently interpreted 
constitutional rights can be better understood as merely one tool available to 
subnational governments in an ongoing practice of intergovernmental struggle 
over policy. That, in turn, explains why state courts are a priori no more likely 
to be inclined to prefer rights-expanding interpretations of state constitutional 
provisions than to prefer rights-contracting ones.21 When and if state courts 
choose to issue rights-expanding decisions thus depends largely on how well 
they believe the federal government is doing its job, a judgment that in today’s 
world is as much about power and partisanship as it is about constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
II. BRENNAN’S ARTICLE AND ITS IMPACT 
A. The Context 
Brennan wrote State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights 
in 1976, at a time that we now know, in retrospect, to have been a unique 
moment in American constitutional history. The national government was then 
riding the crest of an unprecedented, forty-year expansion of its role in 
American life. Its success in lifting the nation out of the Great Depression, 
prosecuting the Second World War, and enacting a good deal of the legislative 
agenda of the civil rights movement conferred on the use of national power 
perhaps the greatest legitimacy it has ever enjoyed.22 Though by 1976 the 
experiences of Vietnam and Watergate had complicated American feelings 
about national power, most in the 1970s continued to look to the national 
                                                                                                                     
 20 Brennan, supra note 2, at 503. 
 21 There is of course a practical complication imposed by the Supremacy Clause 
insofar as it constrains implementation of rights-contracting interpretations of state 
constitutions, but that is a smaller piece of the picture than it might at first seem. That issue 
is taken up below in Part IV.C. 
 22 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 110–15 (2008). 
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government for solutions to significant domestic problems such as 
environmental protection, crime, public transportation, and pension benefits.23 
At the same time, federalism had been badly discredited by its association 
with the Southern regime of Jim Crow.24 Since the end of Reconstruction, and 
certainly since the era of Redemption in the late nineteenth century, Southern 
states had successfully invoked principles of federalism as a shield to protect a 
form of racial apartheid that, according to C. Vann Woodward’s influential 
account, in some ways exceeded in harshness and comprehensiveness the lived 
caste system of slavery that it replaced.25 Southern members of Congress had 
long obstructed national intervention in aggressively asserted Southern 
“sovereignty”26 or “home rule”27 until the 1960s, when televised accounts of 
brutality toward peaceful civil rights marchers eventually made further 
complete obstruction politically impossible.28 The prevailing view among 
liberals was aptly summed up in 1964 by the political scientist William Riker, 
who in an influential book on federalism argued, more than a little reductively, 
that if “one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.”29 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had by the 1970s established individual 
rights as an immensely powerful tool for the deployment of national power 
against recalcitrant states. Because its prohibitions apply directly to the states 
rather than to the national government,30 the Fourteenth Amendment offered 
the Court a mechanism for penetrating the shield that the structural protections 
of federalism had long provided to deviant regional behavior. Brown v. Board 
of Education, which deployed the Equal Protection Clause to dismantle 
segregation,31 was the first great shot in this war of intergovernmental power. 
It was soon followed by a series of decisions under the Due Process Clause 
that greatly expanded the scope of the incorporation doctrine, a reading of the 
                                                                                                                     
 23 E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (1970); National Environmental 
Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970); Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. 
No. 91-452 (1970); Urban Mass Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-453, 84 Stat. 962 
(1970); Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-200, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); Endangered Species 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). 
 24 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM 152–53, 155 (1964). 
 25 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 8, 14, 23–24, 91–92 
(1955). 
 26 ROBERT MICKEY, PATHS OUT OF DIXIE 5 (2015). 
 27 WOODWARD, supra note 25, at 13; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at xix–xx (1988). 
 28 TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1965–68, at 
54–58, 119–20, 122–23(2006); MICKEY, supra note 26, at 261, 288–89, 292. 
 29 RIKER, supra note 24, at 155.  
 30 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis 
added). 
 31 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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Clause that understood it to include and to apply to the states most of the 
protections of the federal Bill of Rights.32 By the 1970s, the Court had applied 
expansive interpretations of individual rights to invalidate state laws in 
sensitive areas of criminal procedure, the death penalty, and public displays of 
religion.33 As Lucas Powe has persuasively argued, an important mission of 
the Warren Court can be fairly understood as dragging the South kicking and 
screaming into the twentieth century.34 
Yet, by the early 1970s, Brennan was already worried that the Supreme 
Court had begun to abandon its commitment to an expansive reading of 
constitutional liberty. As Brennan’s biographers report, “[b]y the spring of 
1971, Brennan did not feel much need to suppress the frustration and anger 
building inside his chambers. Every new opinion seemed to confirm the fears 
he and his clerks shared that the Warren Court’s gains had begun to slip 
away.”35 
B. Brennan’s Argument 
Against this backdrop, why Brennan wrote his article as he did, and why 
his argument struck a chord with so many readers, becomes much easier to 
understand. In State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
Brennan argued that, notwithstanding the prominent role played by the U.S. 
Constitution in the protection of individual rights, in our federal system state 
constitutions play a similar role—they are, he observed, referring to state 
constitutional bills of rights, “a font of individual liberties.”36 The rights 
protections offered by state constitutions, he went on, implement “the 
independent protective force of state law,”37 and in virtue of this independence 
are neither subordinate to nor mere “mirror[s of] the federal Bill of Rights.”38 
Instead, state constitutional rights provisions have independent force, the 
protections of which “often extend[] beyond those required by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of federal law.”39 
For this reason, Brennan argued, “state courts cannot rest when they have 
afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution.”40 
Instead, they must look to state constitutional rights, exercising independent 
                                                                                                                     
 32 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 
U.S. 213, 222 (1967); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968); Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). 
 33 Duncan, 391 U.S. 145, at 149; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972); Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
 34 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490–94 
(2000). 
 35 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 350. 
 36 Brennan, supra note 2, at 491. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 501. 
 39 Id. at 491. 
 40 Id. 
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judgment concerning their meaning, to see if they provide additional 
protection for individual liberty.41 The need for state courts to adopt such a 
practice as a matter of routine, Brennan intimated, is urgent because the 
Supreme Court had by the mid-1970s begun to “pull back from” the 
aggressive enforcement of federal constitutional rights in which it had engaged 
throughout the 1960s.42 In sum, Brennan concluded, the Supreme Court’s 
recent turn to the right “constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the 
breach. . . . With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by 
increasing their own.”43 
C. The Article’s Impact 
Justice Brennan’s challenge to state courts had an immediate effect. Some 
of the nation’s leading state jurists enthusiastically took up Brennan’s 
message, taking to the lecture circuit and the law reviews to repeat, emphasize, 
and refine it.44 But it was on the bench, in actual decisions, that these and 
similarly inclined judges had the greatest impact. There they produced, with 
what Justice Brennan later called “marvelous enthusiasm,”45 a sudden burst of 
independent, rights-protective rulings. Between 1950 and 1959, according to 
one study, a grand total of three decisions were handed down in which a state 
court construed its own state’s constitution to provide protection for individual 
rights greater than that accorded by the U.S. Constitution.46 During the 1960s 
there were seven such rulings, followed by thirty-six more between 1970 and 
1974.47 From there, the pace picked up dramatically.48 Between 1975 and 
1979, state courts issued eighty-eight rights-expanding rulings. They issued 
125 such rulings between 1980 and 1984, and fifty-two more in just two years, 
1985 and 1986.49 Between 1986 and 1994, state courts extended state 
constitutional protections another eighty-five times in the area of criminal 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Id.  
 42 Brennan, supra note 2, at 495.  
 43 Id. at 503. 
 44 E.g., Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 
U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 379 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First]; Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 952 (1982); Stanley Mosk, State 
Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1985); 
Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the 
Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979–80 (1985); 
Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 583, 587–88 (1986). 
 45 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 549 (1986).  
 46 Ronald K. L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual 
Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 16 PUBLIUS 141, 142 (1986). 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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procedure alone.50 These rulings, and subsequent ones, touched on virtually 
every area of constitutional liberties. 
Although this trend was greeted initially by legal scholars with 
enthusiasm,51 critical voices soon appeared. Chief among the early objections 
to the growing practice of independent state constitutional adjudication was 
the charge that such rulings were nothing more than unprincipled, result-
oriented attempts to evade the force of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.52 
As one early critic put it, Justice Brennan had invited state courts to treat their 
state constitution as “little more than a handy grab bag filled with a bevy of 
clauses that may be exploited in order to circumvent disfavored United States 
Supreme Court decisions.”53 
Nor was the public always grateful for state courts’ discovery of the 
rights-protective possibilities of state constitutions. During the 1980s, in a 
backlash against rulings of the California Supreme Court taking an expansive 
view of state constitutional procedural rights for those charged with crime, 
California voters amended the California Constitution to eliminate the state 
constitution’s exclusionary rule,54 thereby making the California Constitution 
considerably more restrictive of rights than the federal Fourth Amendment. 
And in an incident that ushered in the modern era of bitterly contested judicial 
elections, California voters in 1986 turned out three sitting California Supreme 
Court Justices partly in reaction to their repeated invocation of the California 
Constitution as a basis for invalidating criminal punishments, including the 
death penalty.55 A similar popular backlash broke out in Florida, where voters 
by initiative amended the Florida Constitution to require Florida courts to 
construe the state constitutional right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures no more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the federal 
Fourth Amendment.56 
                                                                                                                     
 50 James N.G. Cauthen, State Constitutional Policymaking in Criminal Procedure: A 
Longitudinal Study, 10 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 521, 529 (1999). 
 51 For example, there was an outburst of laudatory symposia. E.g., Special Section, 
The Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 7 (1982); Symposium, The Emergence of 
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985); Symposium, The Revolution in State 
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988); Symposium, State Constitutions in a 
Federal System, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1988); Symposium, State 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 391 (1988); Symposium, State 
Constitutional Law, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989). 
 52 Maltz, Political Dynamic, supra note 17, at 233; Galie, supra note 17, at 763, 769. 
 53 Collins, supra note 17, at 2.  
 54 Grover C. Trask II & Timothy J. Searight, Proposition 8 and the Exclusionary 
Rule: Towards a New Balance of Defendant and Victim’s Rights, 23 PAC. L.J. 1101, 1102 
(1992).  
 55 John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The 
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 
349 (1987).  
 56 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
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Moreover, despite the brouhaha surrounding Justice Brennan’s call to 
arms and the various judicial and scholarly responses, the ultimate impact of 
his article turned out to be limited, and fleeting. With the exception of a 
relatively small proportion of high profile cases, written mostly by a small 
number of vocal judges on a few state courts, the workaday reality of state 
constitutional adjudication remained much the same as it had been before 
publication of Brennan’s article. State courts may well have issued 350 rights-
expanding decisions during the decade following the article’s appearance,57 
but they also issued thousands of decisions in which they refused to construe 
state constitutions to provide protections for individual rights that exceeded 
federal minima. 
Two empirical studies begin to suggest the extent of this trend. Barry 
Latzer’s 1991 study of state constitutional criminal procedure decisions found 
that state courts construe their state constitutions in conformity with federal 
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution in about sixty-eight percent of all 
cases.58 These results were replicated in a 2000 study by James Cauthen, 
which found that between 1970 and 1994 state supreme courts followed the 
federal analysis in sixty-nine percent of a wide variety of cases raising issues 
of individual liberties.59 These two studies, however, very likely overstate the 
actual degree of independence to be found in state constitutional decision 
making. The Latzer study is limited to criminal procedure, the one field in 
which state courts have been most inclined to assert themselves, probably in 
part because of the high proportion of criminal cases appearing on state 
appellate dockets, along perhaps with a resultant sense of expertise and 
confidence among state judges.60 The Cauthen study examines a wider range 
of cases, but excludes those in which the state constitution is not clearly cited 
as the basis for a decision issued on adequate and independent state grounds.61 
The study thus glosses over at the selection phase the widespread practice of 
state courts of failing to distinguish carefully between the state and federal 
constitutions, a practice that severely undermines the possibility of 
independent development of state constitutional law by blurring state and 
federal law at the outset.62 
                                                                                                                     
 57 Wachtler, supra note 10, at 397. 
 58 Latzer, supra note 19, at 192. See also Hugh D. Spitzer, Which Constitution? 
Eleven Years of Gunwall in Washington State, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1187, 1196–1200 
(1998), which finds similar results for the Washington Supreme Court, although it is 
unclear whether those findings still characterize that court’s more recent approach. Hugh 
D. Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: 
“Gunwall Is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!,” 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1169, 1169 (2006). 
 59 Cauthen, supra note 19, at 1196. 
 60 Latzer, supra note 19, at 191.  
 61 Cauthen, supra note 19, at 1193.  
 62 James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 761, 785–88 (1992) [hereinafter Gardner, Failed Discourse]. 
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Finally, the methodology of empirical counting of results obscures the 
degree to which state courts not only follow the U.S. Supreme Court in its 
results, but tend to appropriate, lock, stock, and barrel, the analytic 
frameworks, doctrinal test, and reasoning patterns of federal decisions.63 The 
deference, that is to say, that state courts show to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
constitutional cases goes well beyond mere adoption of ultimate results. Even 
more than the empirical studies reveal, the practice of interpreting state 
constitutional provisions to have the same meaning as—“in lockstep with”64—
parallel provisions of the U.S. Constitution remains the norm. 
To be sure, state supreme courts do occasionally invoke state constitutions 
to issue highly rights-protective rulings in controversial, high-profile cases, the 
best known of which is surely a recent series of rulings concerning gay 
marriage.65 To the extent that Brennan’s article made such rulings more likely 
or more palatable, it continues to have an impact. Nevertheless, high-profile, 
rights-protective rulings remain the exception, and it would not be going too 
far to suggest that the field of state constitutional rights today can be 
characterized as a dual regime in which widespread, transgovernmental 
consensus on a great majority of settled issues exists side-by-side with a 
contrariety of views on a small number of newly emerging, socially salient 
issues.66 
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III. PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF BRENNAN’S ARTICLE: 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. The Methodology Wars 
One undeniable impact of Justice Brennan’s article was its instantaneous 
creation of a demand for a theory both to justify its prescriptions and to guide 
their application. To refute the critique of Brennan’s call to action as 
opportunistic and ideological, supporters of state constitutional activism 
needed to explain the principles on which Brennan’s argument rested. In 
particular, they needed to explain why, how, and in what circumstances state 
constitutions could legitimately be interpreted to provide more expansive 
protection for human rights than the U.S. Constitution. This proved 
considerably more difficult—and contentious—than expected. 
Among judicial and academic commentators, one point of agreement 
quickly emerged: the practice of state constitutional interpretation most 
commonly used by state courts was illegitimate—namely, the more or less 
automatic interpretation of state constitutional provisions to mean the same 
thing as roughly corresponding provisions of the U.S. Constitution.67 This 
practice, soon pejoratively labeled “lockstep interpretation,”68 was not only 
deemed improper, but indeed reviled as the very model of what a coherent 
practice of state constitutional interpretation must strive to avoid. 
Courts practicing lockstep interpretation tended to justify it in terms of the 
desirability of uniformity in state and federal constitutional law. As the Oregon 
Supreme Court said in one well-known case: 
There are good reasons why state courts should follow the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States . . . . 
 
The law of search and seizure is badly in need of simplification for law 
enforcement personnel, lawyers and judges . . . . 
 
. . . While [the exclusionary] rule is in effect, . . . it is important, for the 
guidance of law officers, that the rule be as clear and simple as may be 
reasonably possible, consistent with the constitutional rights of the individual. 
 
. . . Not adopting the [federal] rule . . . would add further confusion in 
that there would then be an “Oregon rule” and a “federal rule.” Federal and 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Linde, First, supra note 44, at 382–83; Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s 
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. 
REV. 353, 356 (1984); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—The Montana 
Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1113–15 (1985). But see Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis 
and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 99 (1988) 
[hereinafter Maltz, Lockstep].  
 68 One of the earliest uses of the term to describe this phenomenon appears to be 
Maltz, Lockstep, supra note 67, at 99. 
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state law officers frequently work together and in many instances do not 
know whether their efforts will result in a federal or a state prosecution or 
both. In these instances two different rules would cause confusion.69 
Critics of lockstep interpretation argued, in contrast, that a judicial 
yearning for simplicity and uniformity in constitutional law could not 
legitimately serve as the basis for construing a state constitution.70 To follow 
blindly decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court when interpreting provisions of 
the state constitution was, critics argued, to accord federal rulings a 
“presumption of correctness” to which they were not entitled.71 
At the same time, critics of lockstep interpretation also agreed that its 
opposite—the interpretation of state constitutions to mean something different 
from the U.S. Constitution—is equally illegitimate when it rests on nothing 
more than mere disagreement with the way in which federal courts construe 
similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution.72 To reject federal constitutional 
doctrine because it seems objectionable was said to be just as bad as adopting 
it because it seems familiar or agreeable.73 Both approaches rest on the same 
fundamental conceptual error: treating state constitutions as though they are 
little more than forums for responding to, or expressing approval or 
disapproval of, developments in federal constitutional doctrine. On this view, 
lockstep and rejectionist approaches to state constitutional interpretation share 
the common defect of failing to accord state constitutions the legal and 
institutional autonomy with which principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty invest them.74 In using these methods, state courts improperly 
respond to federal constitutional doctrine when they should be engaging the 
state constitution on its own terms, as an independent object of legal 
interpretation.75 
Beyond these points concerning how not to proceed, however, agreement 
broke down. Jurists and scholars quickly divided into two vigorously 
disagreeing camps. One group embraced what is now known as the “primacy” 
                                                                                                                     
 69 State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974). While uniformity may be 
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is preferred.” McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981). 
 70 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 67, at 356.  
 71 Id. 
 72 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 73 Collins, supra note 17, at 5–9. 
 74 Williams, supra note 67, at 356; Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 63, at 199; G. ALAN 
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 182 (1998). 
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approach.76 According to this view, state courts should approach problems of 
state constitutional interpretation just as federal courts approach 
interpretational problems under the U.S. Constitution—that is, they should 
treat state constitutions as free-standing, wholly independent sources of 
positive constitutional law.77 This means that state courts should interpret state 
constitutions by bringing to bear all the traditional tools of constitutional 
analysis: text, structure, history, controlling state precedent, and the values of 
the state polity.78 This analysis should be performed, moreover, without resort 
to analogous rulings by federal or other state courts except for the limited 
purpose of providing persuasive guidance. 
The other main position, often called the “interstitial” or “supplemental” 
approach, holds that federal constitutional questions should take pride of place, 
and that state courts should turn to the state constitution only after it becomes 
apparent that the United States Constitution provides inadequate protection for 
the civil liberties at issue.79 Upon making such a determination, the state court 
should then examine the state constitution to determine whether it provides the 
additional increment of protection.80 This approach is usually associated with 
a methodology of state constitutional interpretation, often labeled the “criteria” 
approach, which directs state courts to compare the state constitutional 
provision at issue to its cognate provision in the U.S. Constitution, and to 
construe it to have a different meaning from its federal counterpart only if 
some objective indicium supports the divergent interpretation.81 The indicia 
sufficient to support a divergent interpretation are typically said to include 
differences in the constitutional text, structure, or history; differences in 
controlling state precedent; and differences in the concerns or values of the 
local populace.82 
Both of these positions, however, suffer from significant theoretical flaws, 
which were quickly pointed out by their opponents. Proponents of the primacy 
approach criticized the interstitial approach for replicating the major flaw of 
lockstep interpretation: taking federal constitutional law as the presumptively 
correct baseline from which state constitutional interpretation must proceed.83 
Advocates of the interstitial approach sometimes responded by justifying it as 
better taking into account the contemporary reality of constitutional protection 
                                                                                                                     
 76 TARR, supra note 74, at 183–85.  
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.; Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 63, at 180. 
 79 TARR, supra note 74, at 182–83. 
 80 Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental 
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 81 WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 129–30, 146–69. 
 82 See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965–67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., 
concurring); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986). 
 83 WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 169–77. 
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of individual rights—namely, that the U.S. Constitution has assumed the 
primary role in protecting such rights, and that state constitutions consequently 
can bear only a limited, supplemental role without calling into question their 
legitimacy in the legal order.84 According to the primacy approach, however, 
this position is incoherent because state constitutions are not documents the 
legitimacy of which is or can be called into question; they are positive legal 
enactments with binding force that must be given effect.85 
The primacy approach, however, gives rise to equally difficult problems. 
This method demands that state courts engage the state constitution as an 
independent source of law by examining its text, its history, its structure, 
relevant state precedent, the character and values of the people of the state, and 
prudential considerations relating to the judicial role and the pragmatic 
consequences of judicial resolution of constitutional questions.86 Proponents 
clearly believed that state courts taking this approach would often reach results 
that differ from those reached by federal courts, and that these results would in 
consequence be legitimized by their responsiveness to a distinct body of 
positive law.87 
Yet how likely is it that careful and independent examination of these 
factors would really lead a state court construing the state constitution to reach 
a result significantly different from the result the U.S. Supreme Court might 
reach under the U.S. Constitution? Consider the constitutional text. In 1790, 
the text of state and national constitutions often differed significantly.88 Today, 
however, textual differences are both less common and less dramatic due to 
frequent state constitutional amendment and replacement, and the ubiquitous 
process of language-swapping.89 What about constitutional history? Even 
setting aside the obvious fact that constitutional text and constitutional history 
are hardly independent variables in constitutional interpretation,90 there are 
                                                                                                                     
 84 Pollock, supra note 80, at 717–18; Developments, supra note 80, at 1357–58.  
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370 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
good reasons to think that the historical experiences of individual American 
states differ from the collective historical experiences of the United States only 
in rare and, in all probability, relatively minor ways. The major episodes of 
American life—the colonial experience, the Revolution, the frontier, the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, industrialization, two world wars, the Great 
Depression, the rise of the social welfare state, the civil rights movement, and 
so on—are, from the vantage point of the present, collective, shared 
experiences regardless of how they may have been experienced at the time of 
their occurrence in different places around the nation. This is not to say that 
constitutional history might not differ somewhat from state to state, but that 
the magnitude of any such differences must be greatly reduced through the 
process by which American historical experience is continually 
collectivized.91 
Another problem, this time of a practical nature, also frequently 
confronted state courts attempting to follow the primacy approach: state courts 
searching for relevant state constitutional precedent often found none for the 
simple reason that the law of state constitutional rights was dramatically 
underdeveloped when Justice Brennan issued his call to pay it greater heed.92 
State courts seeking to interpret their own bills of rights often found that the 
provisions had literally never been previously construed.93 In contrast, they 
often found a highly developed body of federal constitutional law construing 
textually and historically similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution.94 
Even more damaging, however, is that the frequent congruity of 
guideposts to federal and state constitutional interpretation casts doubt on a 
fundamental premise of Brennan’s analysis: that state constitutional law is in 
fact, rather than merely in theory, jurisprudentially independent of federal 
constitutional law.95 If state constitutional law is not as a factual matter 
jurisprudentially independent of federal constitutional law—if it looks 
frequently to federal constitutional law not merely for inspiration but as a 
source of concrete legal doctrine—then the liberty-protecting justifications for 
treating it as independent disappear. State constitutional law would still retain 
its potential to serve as an independent and in some cases more generous 
source of individual liberty than national constitutional law, but this potential 
would remain unfulfilled due to the fact that constitutional drafters and 
ratifiers—the people of the states—would have chosen to adopt the federal 
approach, whatever it may be, for purposes of state constitutional doctrine.96 
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B. The Upshot: Little Change in Judicial Practice 
As the dust kicked up by this fierce theoretical debate began to settle 
during the 1990s, a remarkable fact emerged: relatively little had actually 
changed. With the exception of a comparatively small proportion of high 
profile cases, written mostly by a small number of vocal judges on a few state 
courts, the workaday reality of state constitutional adjudication remained much 
the same as it had been before Justice Brennan’s call to arms and the 
subsequent response.97 
State courts did issue many rights-expanding decisions during the decade 
following Justice Brennan’s Harvard Law Review article,98 but they also 
issued many more in which they refused to construe state constitutions to 
provide protections for individual rights that exceed federal minima.99 For 
every state court that has expanded the scope of constitutional liberties under 
the state constitution by refusing to follow some rights-contracting ruling of 
the United States Supreme Court, two or three state courts have followed the 
federal lead by construing the state constitution to provide precisely the same 
reduced level of protection as the federal Constitution.100 For example, 
although five state courts have expressly rejected the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment under which the public has no 
free speech rights in privately owned shopping malls,101 the courts of thirteen 
states have expressly followed the Supreme Court’s lead and construed their 
state constitutions precisely as the Supreme Court has construed the First 
Amendment.102 A 1991 study of state constitutional criminal procedure 
decisions found that state courts construe their state constitutions in 
conformity with federal interpretations of the U.S. Constitution in nearly 
seventy percent of all cases.103 The same study also categorized states as 
“rejectionist” if they rejected federal constitutional doctrine in seventy-five 
percent or more of their independent state constitutional rulings, and 
“adoptionist” if they adopted federal doctrine in seventy-five percent or more 
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of their independent state constitutional decisions.104 The study found that 
adoptionist states outnumbered rejectionist states by twenty-two to four.105 
Many of these results were replicated in a 2000 study, which found that 
between 1970 and 1994 state supreme courts followed the federal analysis in 
sixty-nine percent of all cases raising an issue of individual liberties.106 
State courts have also by and large continued their pre-1970s practice of 
avoiding state constitutional rulings altogether. One study examined state high 
court decisions handed down between 1981 and 1986 that dealt with the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination.107 It found that state courts 
ruled exclusively on federal constitutional grounds in seventy-eight percent of 
the cases.108 Only eight state supreme courts rested their decisions on state 
constitutional law in as many as half of all self-incrimination cases decided 
during the study period, whereas fourteen courts did not consult the state 
constitution in even a single self-incrimination case during the period, and 
another seventeen state high courts did so exactly once.109 Moreover, even 
when state courts do interpret state constitutions, their decisions frequently 
display many of the qualities that proponents of the primacy approach, and 
Justice Brennan before them, initially criticized.110 A study of over 1,200 state 
constitutional decisions issued by the highest courts of seven states during 
1990 found that the great majority of these decisions were characterized by a 
grudging resort to the state constitution; obscurity as to whether the ruling was 
based on state or federal constitutional grounds; a tendency to fall into line, 
without offering any explanation or justification, with federal doctrine 
developed under the U.S. Constitution; and a complete absence of any 
discussion of state constitutional history or the intentions of the state 
constitution’s framers.111 These results were replicated in a more recent study 
of the decisions of four state courts issued during their 2005–2006 terms.112 
A few state courts have, not without some fanfare, self-consciously 
announced themselves adherents of either the primacy or interstitial approach. 
Yet close observation of the performance of even these courts reveals that they 
have rarely stuck to their methodological commitments, and have in fact often 
lapsed into the very kind of lockstep or reactive analysis they so deliberately 
committed themselves to eschew.113 In a 2000 article, a judge of Oregon’s 
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intermediate appellate court argued candidly that “although selected Oregon 
decisions employ some interesting rhetoric about constitutional interpretation,” 
a close examination of the decisions demonstrates that the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s self-conscious methodological commitment to the primacy approach 
“appears to have made little difference other than to provide the courts an 
opportunity to arrive at different results than the application of federal law 
would otherwise require.”114 
Thus, by far the most serious mark against Brennan’s analysis, and the 
primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation it inspired, is that state 
judges so rarely seem interested in following it.115 Indeed, they seem 
uninterested in following it not only when the relevant interpretational 
guideposts all point toward doctrinal convergence, but even when they do 
not—when the constitutional text differs from its federal counterpart; when the 
state constitutional history contains episodes suggesting that it might differ 
materially from the national historical experience; when prior, not to say 
ancient, state decisions construing the state constitution may give reason to 
think that prevailing federal doctrine may be irrelevant.116 Instead, whether by 
lockstep adoption or by rejectionist disagreement, state judges behave 
continually as though one of their principal functions when construing their 
state constitution is to pass judgment on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
construing the national Constitution—to serve, that is, as supporters or 
opponents of federal judicial rulings. This is a practice, of course, that only 
reinforces the view, associated with Brennan’s original critics, that 
aggressively rights-protective interpretations of state constitutional provisions 
are little more than the illicit expression by state judges of ideological 
opposition to rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Even taken individually, but certainly when taken together, these results 
call into question the theoretical premises of Brennan and his followers. 
Certainly the theory fails to provide a good description of what state courts 
actually do. Prescriptively, Brennan urged state courts to do something—
interpret state constitutions to expand state protection for individual rights 
beyond the level provided by the U.S. Constitution—that they are obviously 
disinclined to do. At the same time, Brennan’s account tells state courts that 
the one thing they most consistently do when interpreting state constitutions––
construe them in lockstep with the U.S. Constitution––represents a 
rudimentary error. Something clearly is wrong with this picture. 
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IV. SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND RIGHTS FEDERALISM 
In my view, the principal flaw in Justice Brennan’s famous article, and in 
the judicial and academic theorizing that followed it, is that it ignores the 
shared setting in which state and federal constitutional law are deeply and 
mutually embedded. Both levels of constitutional law function as distinct, yet 
at the same time profoundly interconnected, parts of a federal system. 
Federalism does more than merely carve out separate spheres of self-
sovereignty for state and national governments; it also binds them together in a 
shared system of mutual dependency and shared operational mission. As a 
result, state and federal constitutions are not and cannot be completely 
independent sources of positive law. Rather, they are interlocking parts of a 
larger system in which they operate partly in concert and partly in opposition, 
depending upon a great number of highly contingent factors. Justice Brennan’s 
call to arms was thus built around a significantly incomplete view of state 
constitutional law: he saw the independence, but overlooked the 
interdependence; he saw human rights protections, but missed the 
phenomenon of human rights federalism. 
A. Basic Principles of Federalism 
In the basic Madisonian model to which Americans are heirs, the purpose 
of federalism is clear: to protect liberty.117 “The accumulation of all 
powers . . . in the same hands,” wrote Madison, “may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny.”118 To protect liberty, power must therefore be 
divided.119 Federalism serves this principle of American constitutional design 
by parceling out government powers among different levels of government, 
and by giving each level of government, state and national, substantial powers 
sufficient to allow each to monitor and check the abuses of the other.120 In this 
scheme, Madison, wrote, “a double security arises to the rights of the people. 
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each 
will be controlled by itself.”121 In all but the smallest polities, self-governance 
can proceed only by the delegation of popular power to an agent—a 
government.122 One of the great innovations of the American federal system is 
that the people have secured their own self-interest by dividing power to create 
two distinct governmental agents. 
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Principals frequently employ multiple agents for different purposes. Lord 
Grantham of the popular British television series Downton Abbey (PBS), for 
example, had his butler, his valet, his footman, his chambermaids, his cook, 
his chauffeur, and so forth, and each of these agents performed a very different 
and highly circumscribed task. American federalism, however, takes a 
different approach. The two agents in the system—the state and national 
governments—are charged not with pursuing distinct goals, but with pursuing 
largely the same set of goals, and each does so independently, under an 
independent delegation of authority.123 It is not only the national government 
that is charged to “promote the general welfare.”124 State governments have 
the same charge.125 
The “double security” of which Madison spoke, then, does not arise so 
much from some complicated scheme of complementary powers, as is often 
supposed,126 but from a conceptually much simpler arrangement in which the 
state and national governments independently police much of the same turf.127 
Of course the overlap of mission is not complete; each level of government 
has exclusive or dominant authority in some spheres of public action.128 Still, 
most of the important powers held by each level of government are 
concurrent,129 allowing state and national authorities to occupy, and indeed to 
compete with one another in, the most important realms of public affairs.130 
This overlap of authority is essential to the success of the constitutional 
plan. As Madison explained, “the great security against a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving 
to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”131 A successful 
and sustainable separation of powers through mutual checking, Madison 
argued, thus requires not complete separation of powers—an arrangement 
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Madison referred to disparagingly as “parchment barriers”132—but significant 
overlap among them.133 It is only in virtue of the possession by each agent of 
some share of control over the same fields of action that each agent obtains the 
“constitutional means . . . to resist encroachments of the others.”134 Dual 
policing of the same territory is thus the feature of constitutional design that 
enables each level of government not merely to monitor the behavior of the 
other, but to attempt, and sometimes to succeed, in checking and counteracting 
its abuses.135 
This structure is in many respects little different from a variety of 
commonplace arrangements in which a principal does not quite trust its agent, 
and so brings in a second agent to monitor the first one. A homeowner, for 
example, might hire a general contractor to undertake a large construction 
project, but might at the same time employ an inspector to check the 
contractor’s work to make sure it is of the type and quality contracted for. A 
corporation or other organization might delegate or outsource some significant 
task, but also employ an auditor to make sure it is billed accurately and 
honestly. Congress charges government agencies with carrying out legislative 
instructions, but also creates in many agencies an inspector general’s office to 
monitor agency performance. Federalism contemplates a similar arrangement 
for similar reasons: the delegation to government of the people’s power to 
govern themselves is an action fraught with risk, and an arrangement of dual 
agency provides additional assurances that the work will be done to the 
principal’s satisfaction. 
B. State Constitutions in a Federal System 
In its creation of the system of federalism, and its specification of the 
authority of the national government, the U.S. Constitution establishes a 
critically important piece of the constitutional architecture of dual, mutually 
checking governmental agents. It does not, however, establish the entirety of 
that architecture; state constitutions also play an indispensable role in 
constructing the federal system. 
State constitutions do for state power what the U.S. Constitution does for 
national power: they structure and allocate it and establish the purposes for 
which it may—and may not—be used.136 In a federal system like ours, state 
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 135 See id. at 322. 
 136 Regarding the functions of constitutions generally, see EDWARD SCHNEIER, 
CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2–3 
(2006); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 
412, 415–16 (2007); Jeremy Waldron, Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View, in 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 273–74 (Thomas Christiano & John 
Christman eds., 2009). Regarding state constitutions in particular, see Jonathan L. 
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constitutions thus perform three principal functions. First, they create a state 
government and invest it with the powers necessary to accomplish the goals 
for which the people of the state create a government—“to secure and 
perpetuate [the] blessings [of freedom]”;137 “to provide for the health, safety 
and welfare of the people”;138 to “insure justice to all, preserve peace, promote 
the interest and happiness of the citizen and of the family, and transmit to 
posterity the enjoyment of liberty.”139 State constitutions consequently grant 
state governments extensive authority to regulate public and private affairs and 
to raise and spend money to fund beneficial programs.140 
Second, like the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions impose restraints on 
the exercise of granted governmental powers so that the state government, an 
agent charged with pursuing the goals of the state populace, does not turn on 
its own principal.141 Thus, state constitutions universally contain a host of 
well-established devices for limiting governmental power.142 Such devices 
typically include a formal horizontal separation of powers, procedural 
prerequisites for the use of state power, and substantive limits on the scope of 
state power. Substantive limits may inhere in internal limitations on the scope 
of granted powers,143 or they may be imposed through specific restrictions on 
the purposes for which state power may be deployed,144 or through the 
inclusion of a bill of rights, a feature found in every state constitution. 
Third, because they are embedded in a federal system, state constitutions 
grant an additional form of power to state governments: the power to resist and 
check abuses of national power.145 In the Madisonian model, as we have seen, 
a functioning federal system is one in which “the different governments will 
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.” The 
U.S. Constitution serves this imperative by authorizing the national 
government to deploy its powers to monitor and check abuses of state 
authority.146 The national government has frequently deployed many of its 
powers in just this way. Federal courts, for example, have often used the 
power of judicial review to invalidate state laws that transgress federal 
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constitutional boundaries.147 Congress has used its power to enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to enact civil rights legislation that 
powerfully constrains the way states may treat their own citizens.148 And 
Congress has often used its power to spend money to encourage state behavior 
that it thinks beneficial to the American public.149 
A well-functioning federal system, however, demands that monitoring and 
checking occur from both directions, from below as well as from above. It 
follows, then, that states must possess a reciprocal authority to monitor and 
check abuses of national power. Since state constitutions are the foundational 
sources from which state governments derive their powers, state constitutions 
necessarily must authorize states to deploy their powers so as to resist what 
they believe to be national encroachments on public welfare.150 
I have elsewhere described in some detail the tools and methods that 
American states, consistent with the Madisonian model, have from time to 
time deployed to resist exercises of national power with which they 
disagree.151 These include techniques deployed in advance to influence the 
final content of national policy decisions, such as harnessing the state’s 
congressional delegation, lobbying, and mobilization of public opinion.152 
States also have many tools at their disposal to undermine or blunt the impact 
of enacted national policies they view as inimical to the public welfare. These 
include the use of affirmatively granted state power to seize the initiative in 
policy making, refusal of spending incentives, uncooperative implementation 
of national policy, administrative negotiation, and litigation, as well as 
stronger (if not always fully legal) measures such as outright defiance of 
national authority.153 
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The point is this. The system of federalism established by the U.S. 
Constitution protects liberty and furthers the people’s collective goals by 
institutionalizing a kind of permanent conflict between the national and 
subnational levels of government.154 Federalism creates a system of dual 
agency; charges both agents to pursue independently an identical, or at the 
very least significantly overlapping, set of goals; and then settles on each agent 
the additional burden of making sure the other agent stays on task.155 Because 
the state and national governments pursue largely the same set of popular 
goals, the range of this contestatory dynamic is not limited to any particular 
domain; on the contrary, it is capable of extending across the entire landscape 
of possible governmental action. State–national conflict might thus emerge in 
any arena of policy or public endeavor. We might, for example, observe a 
form of environmental federalism, in which the state and national levels 
engage in conflict over the goals or implementation of environmental policy. 
We might similarly observe conflict in the form of education federalism,156 
immigration federalism,157 or foreign policy federalism.158 
C. Human Rights Federalism 
The force of Justice Brennan’s Harvard Law Review article was its 
startling insight—a correct one—that the field of human rights protection 
could itself be an arena in which the state and national governments might 
struggle over the content and scope of the American commitment to observe 
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and respect the rights and dignity of individuals. The protection of human 
rights is not something that the architecture of federalism assigns exclusively 
to the national level; it is, on the contrary, a shared function, to be pursued 
simultaneously at both levels through the identification and active policing of 
such rights.159 As Brennan observed, the federal Bill of Rights is hardly the 
only such document in our system. It is, to be sure, the nation’s most 
celebrated bill of rights, but every state has independently entered the field of 
rights protection by enacting and constitutionalizing its own bill of rights. 
As a result, the proper scope of protection for human rights can be a 
subject of disagreement and contention among the orders of government. It 
should by no means be assumed that all fifty states and the national 
government agree completely on the scope of protection to be accorded to 
each and every human right receiving the dual protection of the state and 
national constitutions. In accordance with the federal dynamics of 
intergovernmental contestation, whenever any such disagreement appears, 
each order of government can be expected to use the resources at its disposal 
to advance its own view of the appropriate level of protection, and to resist 
what it views as misguided decisions about rights protection advanced by its 
competitor. It was this vision that so excited Brennan’s supporters. 
What Justice Brennan failed to perceive, however, was that federalism’s 
assignment of responsibility for protecting individual rights to both orders of 
government says nothing about the likelihood of disagreement among them, 
much less that the disagreement might run in any particular direction. The 
federal system of dual agency requires each agent continually to examine and 
to judge the actions of the other. If such a system is to succeed in its goal of 
keeping both agents on track in implementing the wishes of their common 
principal, then each must exercise independent judgment about what 
fulfillment of those wishes requires in any particular instance. Thus, in the 
arena of human rights protection, each agent must decide for itself what 
balance between government empowerment and constraint best conduces to 
public welfare. There is no a priori outcome of this deliberative task. It is in 
principle just as possible—and just as permissible—for states to conclude that 
the national government has done a commendable job in striking the balance 
between individual rights and government power as it is for states to conclude 
that the national government has done a poor job, either by according too little 
protection to human rights or, indeed, too much. 
This is where Justice Brennan missed the mark. He assumed that the lack 
of aggressively independent state judicial deployment of state constitutional 
rights, and the proliferation of lockstep state supreme court opinions, indicated 
                                                                                                                     
 159 Originally, the only direct protection for human rights was provided by state 
constitutions; the U.S. Constitution as adopted did not initially have a bill of rights. When 
in 1791 the federal Bill of Rights was adopted, it applied solely to the federal government. 
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833). Adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment altered the landscape by intermingling rights protection at each level of 
government. 
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a lack of appreciation by state judges of the nature of state constitutional 
independence. But there is another explanation. Although federalism creates 
the conditions in which disagreement among the orders of government may 
appear and become an object of active conflict, there is nothing inevitable 
about the emergence of such disagreement. It is no more inevitable that states 
disagree with the national government over policies of free speech, freedom of 
religion, or warrantless searches than it is that they disagree over the details of 
policies concerning environmental protection, immigration, or economic 
development. And even when one state disagrees with national policy, there is 
no reason to assume that other states will share that disagreement, or that 
disaffection on the state level will spread like a contagion. After all, the very 
first attempt in American history to build a state-level movement against a 
controversial national human rights policy—public protests by Virginia and 
Kentucky of press censorship by the John Adams administration160—died on 
the vine when a disposition to resist remain confined to those two states. 
It follows that the predominance of lockstep interpretation by state 
supreme courts construing state constitutional rights provisions could just as 
well reflect a very different dynamic in which (1) states conscientiously 
monitor the performance of the national government in the field of human 
rights protection; (2) state supreme courts by and large approve of that 
performance; and (3) when state courts find it necessary to construe rights 
provisions of their state constitutions, they simply adopt approaches developed 
at the national level that they find satisfactory.161 
If anything, agreement at the state and national levels about the 
appropriate level of rights protection is likely to be far more common than 
disagreement, just as it is in other policy domains. The state and national 
governments are agents of a single national polity organized for various 
purposes into different subnational groupings. National policies toward human 
rights are in the long run likely to reflect nationwide trends in public opinion, 
trends from which individual state polities are hardly immune, and to which 
they in fact contribute. Public opinion at the state and national levels, that is to 
say, may frequently coincide—not always, and rarely uniformly across all the 
states, but often enough to make state adoption of national policies a 
commonplace occurrence.162 
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Indeed, congruity of state and national policy preferences is especially 
likely in the U.S. federal system for two related reasons. First, the major 
ideological cleavages in the United States tend not to be territorial, but 
partisan.163 Second, political parties in the United States typically display a 
strong degree of vertical integration, meaning that the policy commitments of 
Democrats and Republicans at the national party level tend to be similar to the 
commitments held their by their state-level affiliates.164 
Taken together, these two facts mean that differences of opinion, even 
very strong ones, may exist in the United States, but that the contestants are 
rarely divided by geographical boundaries. Instead, differences of opinion are 
far more likely to exist within every state, as on the national level, and to be 
organized by partisan affiliation.165 The major cleavages in public opinion 
therefore rarely pit some distinctive local opinion in Nebraska or Pennsylvania 
against a very different nationwide opinion; rather, they tend to pit Democrats 
and Republicans against each other at both the state and national levels.166 
When the party out of favor at the national level controls a state, the conditions 
are present for state-national conflict, but the frontier of conflict will likely be 
defined by the ideological commitments of the respective parties, not the 
territorially organized polities.167 By the same token, when the same political 
party controls the national government and the government of a state, there is 
likely to be a good deal of congruity of policy preference. In these 
circumstances, we can hardly be surprised to see a state supreme court 
marching in lockstep with the U.S. Supreme Court, even when the policies in 
question concern the scope of protection for human rights. 
Of course, these are tendencies, not ironclad laws, and it is certainly 
possible for a state’s constitutional jurisprudence of human rights to be 
thoroughly independent of national jurisprudence. Yet even in those 
circumstances, the fact that a state court exercises independent judgment about 
the appropriate level of human rights protection in the United States says 
nothing about either the substance of that judgment, or how it will be 
expressed at the doctrinal level. If the state court, in the exercise of its 
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independent judgment, finds that the U.S. Supreme Court is doing an inspired 
job protecting rights, that judgment might very well result in a convergence of 
constitutional doctrine. If a state court finds the U.S. Supreme Court’s work 
wanting, it might disagree in either an upward or downward direction from the 
national baseline; it might, that is, conclude that the national government is 
striking a poor balance between collective power and individual liberty by 
providing either too little or too much protection for human rights. 
In those cases, the state jurisprudence might correspondingly set the level 
of protection at a higher level, as Justice Brennan urged, but it is equally 
possible that the state court could decide that national protection for rights is 
too high, and set the state bar lower. As the Oregon Court of Appeals has 
observed, “[i]ndependent development of the law under [the Oregon 
Constitution] can lead to situations in which that law is less protective than is 
the law under [the U.S. Constitution].”168 Similarly, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals has noted that the supremacy of federal constitutional law 
“does not mean that the Texas Constitution has no ceilings that are lower than 
those of the federal constitution,” and that “[t]he ceiling of one may be lower 
than the floor of the other.”169 
Of course state courts in practice lack the power to implement any 
downward divergence from the national baseline of rights protection by 
operation of the incorporation doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, but that 
does not mean that such judgments by state courts are without effect. This kind 
of disagreement can be meaningful in the long run through the interactive 
process of dialogic engagement characteristic of judicial federalism. In this 
process, state and federal courts influence each other’s interpretations of law 
through a pattern of continuous public conversation conducted through judicial 
rulings and opinions.170 
In some of the best-known instances, state supreme courts have influenced 
the U.S. Supreme Court to increase the level of national rights protection by 
taking highly rights-protective positions as a matter of state law. For example, 
the embrace of the exclusionary rule by state courts during the 1940s and 
1950s influenced the U.S. Supreme Court in 1961 to reverse itself and adopt 
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches by state law enforcement 
officials that violated the Fourth Amendment.171 More recently, state rulings 
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interpreting state constitutions to prohibit discrimination against gays and 
lesbians—and in so doing deliberately rejecting federal constitutional law to 
the contrary—were instrumental in influencing the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reverse itself in Lawrence v. Texas and hold that the U.S. Constitution 
prohibits criminal punishment of gay sex.172 
But, as in other arenas of intergovernmental relations, state influence can 
work in the other direction as well—rulings by state supreme courts can 
persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to lower, or perhaps more commonly to 
decline to increase, levels of rights protection afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution. For example, in deciding whether a warrantless search of an 
office incident to an arrest made there was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court looked for guidance to state constitutional law: 
When construing state safeguards similar to the Fourth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, states courts have shown little hesitancy in holding that 
incident to a lawful arrest upon premises within the control of the arrested 
person, a search of the premises at least to the extent conducted in the instant 
case is not unreasonable.173 
Similarly, a history of stingy rights protection in the states can influence 
the U.S. Supreme Court to set the level of protection afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution at a comparably stingy level. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, for 
instance, the Court found it significant that practice under state constitutions of 
the founding era, which had provided models for the Fourth Amendment, 
supported a broad interpretation of state authority under the U.S. Constitution 
to make warrantless arrests on misdemeanor charges.174 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Brennan’s 1977 Harvard Law Review article is justly celebrated 
for the attention it drew to the independence of state constitutional law and to 
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the potential of this body of law to carry forward the rights revolution initiated 
by the Warren Court. But the article’s more important legacy is the spotlight it 
threw on the previously overlooked phenomenon of human rights federalism. 
Brennan’s article, it is true, initially sowed jurisprudential confusion through 
its inattention to the large-scale constitutional structures, practical ground-
level mechanisms, and official incentives that shape this important arena of 
intergovernmental contestation. Nevertheless, it is clear in retrospect that 
Brennan’s article sparked a vigorous public debate about the appropriate role 
of the state and national governments in the protection of human rights, a 
debate that at that time seemed to have been settled in favor of national power. 
In so doing, Brennan provided an important public service that has stimulated 
useful advances in public and legal understandings of the significance of 
federalism in the field of human rights protection. 
Justice Brennan’s article did not summon into existence the system he 
envisioned, in which state courts bravely and single-mindedly resist and 
countermand every retreat on human rights protection effectuated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. We do, however, have a much more subtle and responsive 
system in which state courts monitor the performance of the federal judiciary 
and express their approval or disapproval of federal performance in the course 
of adjudicating human rights claims under state constitutions. In so doing, 
state courts join the federal bench in a crucial, ongoing conversation about 
human dignity and the appropriate ways for governments to respect it. 
  
